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1 Introduction 
Since the pioneering work of Blanchard and Diamond (1989,1990), Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) and 
Pissarides (1990), among others, the "flow approach" to labor markets is now a mature research area. 
The great advantage of not only considering stocks of employed and unemployed workers but also 
taking the behavior of die gross flows of jobs and workers into account is that one gets much more 
insight into the dynamic relation between unemployment, employment and nonparticipation. 
In this paper we study the relation between the allocation of labor and the business cycle. In section 
two we will discuss some new empirical results on worker and job flows for the Netherlands and 
compare them with recent studies for other European counrries and the U.S. The evidence suggests 
that: (1) flows into and out of the labor market are large in relation to the stocks. (2) The sum of 
employment inflow and outflow and the sum of job creation and job destruction, which can be viewed 
as a proxy for reallocation activity, move countercyclical. (3) Both the extent and the cyclical behavior 
of job creation and job destruction varies remarkably between sectors. (4) The level and the persistence 
of newly created jobs are strongly pro-cyclical, while the level and persistence of destroyed jobs are 
strongly counter-cyclical. (5) The time variation of job creation and job destruction in the Netherlands 
is more driven by aggregate shocks than by sectoral shocks. Other foreign studies that also take the 
effect of idiosyncratic shocks into account, find that those shocks explain the majority of time 
variation in job creation and job destruction. (6) About one third of the worker flows are generated by 
job creation and job destruction. 
These results challenge a large class of business cycle models which predict that flows into employ-
ment grow during expansions, for example the monetary misperception model of Lucas (1972) in 
which inflow into employment increases through misperceptions, about theaeal wage or some of the 
earlier real business cycle models, e.g. Kydland and Prescott',(1982) and Long and Plosser (1983), 
which portray expansions as times when productivity is high and because.-öf that labor supply 
increases. Those theories cannot explain the fact that booms are times when.employment outflow is 
low rather than times when the inflow into employment is high. - -?r"rC 
In section 3 we will come up with a number of explanations for our findings. Most of our attention 
will go out to Davis and Haltiwanger's (1990) "proto type" model of job reallocation. We will use and 
extend this model to explain the empirical findings. The basic idea can be compared with a cycle race. 
Imagine a cyclist who has to drive a circuit with hills. Since he has to cycle all day, he has to eat and 
drink during the race, otherwise he will slow down at the end of the day. However he cannot consume 
any food or drinks when he drives too fast. When should mis cyclist eat or drink? Well cléarly he 
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will not take any consumptions when he goes downhill, where he can reach speeds of 70 km an hour. 
Also when he is going down the wind, the opportunity costs of going slower are higher. The best time 
for him to slow down and "invest" in his physical condition by eating and drinking, will be either 
when he goes uphill or when he cycles against the wind. Moreover it might pay for him to wait with 
drinking while he is thirsty till a hill arrivés or postpone his food consumption even when he is 
hungry, till he cycles against the wind. If one thinks of the hills and the wind as corresponding to a 
recession then one would expect that during that period, firms will engage in activities that increase 
future productivity at the expense of current production, just as the cyclist would do. According to this 
view, recessions are not necessarily times when activity is low. In section 4 we will shortly discuss 
some policy issues and study the implications of a "reallocation timing effect" in an economy with 
many profit maximizing firms that cannot coordinate their actions. Finally some preliminary remarks 
about the relation between job creation and economie growth will be made. 
2. An Overview of Empirical Results 
What would we expect about the cyclical behaviour of gross worker and job flows? We would expect 
job creation to rise and job destruction to fall in an expansion while in a recession we would expect 
the opposite. But will those responses be symmetrie? If we think of the effects on entry and exit of 
firms, the answer is no, since an existing firm only has to cover marginal costs, while a new firm will 
only be opened if anticipated average costs are met. In terms of job creation and job destruction, in a 
recession we would expect job creation to fall more than job destruction rises. The few studies on the 
cyclical behavior of job creation and job destruction that have been done so far find exactly the 
opposite. We will discuss our results and compare them with other recent studies in section 2.2. 
Usually worker flows will exceed job flows, sir ~e except for the case of an unfilled vacancy, a newly 
created job goes hand in hand with a worker movement but worker movements are not necessarily 
accompanied by job creation and job destruction, since they may reflect for example life-cycle or 
career decisions. Recent studies, e.g. Anderson and Meyer (1994) find that about one third of the 
worker flows is driven by job creation and destruction. This is also about the fraction we find for the 
Netherlands. 
The cyclical response of worker flows is also unlikely to be symmetrie if we take into account that 
quits move procyclical. Given that fact we would expect the sum of inflow into and outflow out of 
employment to move procyclical. Again, this is not what is found in the data. Blanchard and Diamond 
(1990) find that the sum of flows out of and into U.S. employment are anti-cyclical. In the next 
section we will show, with a less sophisticated methad, that a similar result holds for the Netherlands. 
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Burda and Wyplosz (1993), (1994) confïrm those results for other European countries and Japan. Our 
most surprising result is that the inflow into employment is countercyclical. Burda and Wyplosz find 
that gross unemployment outflow in most countries also moves counter cyclical. For the U.S. and the 
Netherlands, as we will show below, this last result does not hold. 
2.1 The Cyclical Behavior of Worker Flows in the Netherlands. 
In this section we will first describe how we identifïed the gross employment flows, then we will 
analyze their cyclical behavior and finally we will compare our results with other worker flow studies. 
2.1.1 The data1 
Annual data on the flow of unemployed workers into unemployment (Feu) and disability (Fed) are 
available for the Netherlands. Furthermore, we have data on the outflow of workers into early and 
normal retirement and the mortality of workers (Feer, Fer, Fem respectively). We thus have the total 
gross flow of persons from employment to unemployed (Feu) and non-paiticipation (Fen=Fed+Feer 
+Fem). Together with the net change in employment, we can now easily construct the gross inflow of 
new workers into employment, since: 
AE = Inflow - Outflow thus 
Inflow = AE + Outflow = AE + (Feu + Fen) 
In our analysis we will consider both the cyclical behavior of the flows in and out of employment and 
unemployment as well as the flows between employment and ww2 unemployment (Feu and Fue). 
Note that our series do not include the job to job movers.3 This flow is typically associated with 
voluntary quits and will make the relation between worker and job flows more fiizzy. For exampie if 
rwo persons switch jobs, both employment inflow and outflow will increase while in fact no jobs have 
For a complete treatment of the data we refer to Appendix 4. 
2
 One was eligible (in the sample period) for ww benefits when one has woiked for at least 156 days (from 1987 onwards 
this is 182 days) in the 12 months before one got unemployed. The height is 70% of the daily wage. The duration of ww 
entitlement varies from 6 months to 4.5 years. Furthermore one has to be "unvoluntary" unemployed, in practice this means 
unemployed due to firing. 
3
 We have experienced with an approximation of job to job flows. This flow series moved significandy pro-cyclical. Inclu-
ding this component in "inflow" and "outflow" did however not change our main result that the sum of employment inflow and 
outflow moves counter-cyclical. 
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been created and destroyed. An advantage of using Dutch data, is that in the Netherlands, temporary 
layoffs4 are a rare phenomenon. In the presence of temporary layoffs, the relation between worker 
flows and job creation and job destruction again becomes much more unclear. For more details about 
the data, we refer to appendix 4. 
2.1.2 Magnitude and cyclical behavior of the worker flows 
As can be seen in Table Al and A2 (in the appendix), flows into and out of unemployment and 
employment are substantial. Thus despite the well-known hysteresis effects, the Dutch labor market is 
in fact quite active. This is also true for other European countries, like France, Spain, Germany and 
the U.K. as Burda and Wyplosz (1993, 1994) show. Table A3 shows that the flows between 
employment and unemployment are also quite large. The Feu flow will be closely related to the job 
destruction flow, since it measures the flow of fired workers. 
Table A4 and figure 1 show that employment and unemployment inflow and outflow are highly 
coherent. Burda and Wyplosz (1993) show that this also holds for France, Germany, the U.K. and 
Spain. Of course part of the high correiation is due to non-stationarity, but it may also reflect the 
importance of reallocation. 
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Figure 1. Employment inflow and outflow in the Netherlands in 
(1000 persons) 
We also see from figure 1 that employment inflow and outflow move close together (the correiation 
4
 In the United States, a significant part of the layoffs is temporary. 
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coëfficiënt is 0.86), except for the periods 1980 and 1988 in which employment inflow strongly 
increased. Part of this increase can be attributed to part-time work, which biases employment figures. 
Table 1 The cyclical behavior of unemployment and employment flows 
Dependent variable cap. utilization real GDP growth unemployment growth5 
Employment Flows 
Inflow (log) -0.38 (-0.71) -0.85 (-1.20) 0.23 (1.59) 
Outflow (log) * -1.22 (-1.73) (*) -0.952 (-1.58) 0.41 (4.19) 
Outflow rate (log)6 -0.144 (-2.27)* -0.08 (-1.57)* 0.04 (3.90) 
SUM (log) -0.95 (-2.16) -1.19 (-1.98) 0.24 (2.00) 
Unemployment Flows 
Inflow (log) (*H-35 (-233) (*>1.04 (-2.10) (*)0.25 (3.43) 
Outflow (log) 038 (0.71) 0.80 (1.08) -0.20 (-1.46) 
Outflow rate (log) 3.84 (2.24) 236 (1.55) -0.50 (-1.54) 
Sum (log) -031 (-0.65) -0.27 (-0.43) 0.09 (0.73) 
Flows between Employm-
ent and Unemployment 
Feu (log) -1.90 (-2.47) -1.94 (-1.87) 0.61 (3.91) 
Fue (log) 1.23 (1.28) 2.40 (1.96) -0.02 (-0.09) 
Fue/U(-1) logs 1.62 (1.18) 2.45 (1.98) -0.08 (-0.29) 
Sum (log) (*>036 (-0.53) (*)-0.11 (-0.13) 0.44 (2.92) 
5
 We choose unemployment rather than employment growth because the variation in unemployment is much bigger. Later, 
in section 2.2.4 when we anaiyze the cyclical behavior of job flows in the manufactunng sector, we will use net employment 
change in the manufactunng sector because we don't have information about unemployment in the manufactunng sector. 
6
 The Outflow rate is defined as the outflow/stock(-l) 
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Table 1 shows the cyclical behavior of flows into and out of employment, ignoring the job to job 
flows7. The most striking result is that gross infiow into employment moves counter cyclical. Again 
this result is also found in other European countries. 
In the table coëfficiënt estimates are given of respectively: the log of capacity utilization, differences 
of the log of real GDP and differences of log employment, in a regression of the dependent variable 
on itself lagged (coefficients with an asterisk are from regressions with two lags of the dependent 
variable), a constant, a linear time trend and the cyclical measure. The sample period is 1971-1991. In 
table A5, Rz and autocorrelation tests are presented. 
With the information of table 1 we are now able to say a little bit more about the anti-cyclicality of 
employment infiow. We can see that the Fue flow is pro-cyclical and that total unemployment outflow 
is also procyclical. How can those facts be explained? We know that unemployment outflow consists 
of the flow from unemployment to employment and of the flow from unemployment to nonpar-
ticipation. We do not have data on this last flow but it is likely to be anti-cyclical because in 
recessions the chances of finding a job (and hence the rewards to search) decrease, so more people will 
get discouraged and will stop to search actively. A second reason for the anticyclicality of the Fun 
flow is that the larger the stock of unemployment is, the larger the outflow will be8. Since unemploy-
ment moves countercyclical, unemployment outflow into non-participation will also move anti-cyclical. 
From the lower part of table 5 we see that the flow from (ww)-unemployment (see footnote 2) to 
employment moves procyclical and it is likely that the flow from (rww)-unemployment9 to employ-
ment also moves pro-cyclical (since total unemployment outflow moves pro-cyclical). But this means 
that the anticyclicality of employment infiow is caused by a countercyclical non-participation-employ-
ment flow (Fne). Blanchard and Diamond (1990) find however for the U.S. that Fne decreases and that 
Fue increases after a negative demand shock. A tentative explanation for our findings may be the 
following: When employers have imperfect information about the quality of workers, the fact that a 
worker is unemployed can be viewed as a negative signal from the employer's point of view. 
Therefore, employers prefer non-participants. In recessions, therefore the infiow into employment will 
consist of a relatively large share of non-participants (for example school leavers) while in booms, the 
unemployed workers also get a chance to enter employment. Another explanation for the counter-
cyclical employment infiow, following the "matching-literature," is that when the stock of non-
Recently we calculated job to job movements, which, as one would expect, appear to be strongly pro-cyclical. If the job 
to job flows are included in "infiow", the total flow into employment becomes insignificantly pro-cyclical. 
8
 If we take the extreme case in which unemployment is zero, it is obvious that unemployment outflow is also zero. 
9
 School leavers and long-term unemployed are eligible for RWW, unemployment (70% of the 
minimum wage). 
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Since reallocation shocks will generate both high rates of employment inflow and outflow, the sum of 
those variables can be used as a proxy for reallocation activity. As can be seen in figure 2 dlreall10 
moves countercyclical. This result is in agreement with the findings of Blanchard and Diamond (1990). 
In section 3 we will describe a model that explains why reallocation activities are concentrated in 
recessions. 
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Figure 2 The cyclical behavior of employment reallocation 
For the Feu flows we have got separate information about males and females. It appears that the em-
ployment-unemployment flow for males is strongly countercyclical, while the employment-unemploy-
ment flow for females is unrelated to the business cycle". 
2.2 Job Flows 
In this section, we present the results of our study on job flows in the Netherlands. First we will give 
a short description of the data. Then we will discuss the magnitude, time variance and persistence of 
the job flows and in addition analyze the relative importance of aggregate and sectoral shocks in 
explaining the time variance of job creation, destruction and reallocation. Finally we will discuss the 
relation between job and worker flows. 
dlreall is defined as the growth rate of the sum of employment in and outflow and dlrgdp is the growth rate of real 
GDP. The right scale gives growth rates of reall, while the left scale gives growth rates of real GDP. 
' " The coëfficiënt of log capita] utilization in a regression as in table 5, with log Feu males as the dependent variable, is 
-1.77 (-2.04) while for females this coëfficiënt is 0.12 (0.76) 
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relation between job and worker flows. 
2.2.1 The Data 
We use a panel of 3044 manufacturing firms (about 70 % of total employment) having more than ten 
employees, over the period 1978-1992. The data were collected by the Dutch Central Bureau of 
Statistics, on the basis of yearly questionnaires including the number of employees. There is substantial 
attrition in the production statistics because of bankruptcy, mergers, firms dropping below the 
employment threshold etc. Therefore we mainly focused on the data of firms that were available over 
the full fourteen year period12. Gross job creation is then calculated by summing up net employment 
changes at expanding firms within a sector. Gross job destruction is calculated by summing employ-
ment losses at shrinking firms within a sector. Dividing by sector sizes then gives gross rates of job 
creation and destruction. It is thus assumed that job creation and job destruction do not simultaneously 
take place within a firm. Hamermesh et al (1994). show that this assumption is acceptable for the 
Netherlands13. Secondly, since only plant level employment is observed, it is impossibie to determine 
whether different employment levels for different periods, represent different employment positions. 
Thus, the gross job creation and gross job destruction rates are lower bounds on the actual values. 
Before we continue, some short remarks will be made about how representative the manufacturing 
sector for the whole economy is. In the Netherlands, the manufacturing industry accounts for only one 
fifth of employment, this is about the same as in the U.S.. Anderson and Meyer (1994a,b) show that 
the job creation rates in the manufacturing sector of the U.S. do not differ very much from those based 
on all industries. Davis and Haltiwanger, for example find values for manufacturing job creation and 
job destruction of 0.092 and 0.113, while the corresponding rates in Anderson and Meyer's sample of 
all industries are 0.102 and 0.115. Blanchflower and Burgess (1994) report that manufacturing 
accounted for about one-third of total job creation while the share of the manufacturing sector is also 
around one third in the U.K. 
2.2.2 Measurement 
The notation, as was introduced by Davis and Haltiwanger, that is used to define the job flows is now 
commonly used in the literature. Formally, job creation and destruction per sector are calculated as: 
In appendix A2 an analysis of job creation and job destruction due to entry and exit of firms is given. 
They show that in 1990 the average extemal flows are more than seven times as large as the interna] mobility 
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NEGsl= Y, 
Where E„ is the set of finns in our panel, x^ is the average employment at firm f between t and t-1 
and X,, is the size of sector s. The sum of POS,, and NET„ (SUMJ is a measure of job reallocation or 
job turnover between period t and t-1. 
2.23 Magnitude and persistence of job creation and destruction 
Table 2 presents job creation, job destruction and job reallocation in rates and in persons (POSP and 
NETP). Our sample period (79-91) gives a balanced view of the business cycle. During this period, 
employment in the manufacturing sector contracted seven times and rosé six times. EXCESS measures 
the difference between total job reallocation and the absolute value of employment change (which is 
the minimum of job reallocation that is required'4). EXCESS can be interpreted as a measure for 
heterogeneity. A nonzero value for EXCESS implies that firms are not homogeneous. 
Table 2 Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Netherlands (79-91) 
Variable Mean S.D. (cross industry) Maximum Minimum 
POSP 28129.5 5805.7 36575 (1990) 17858 (1982) 
NEGP 37144.4 7485.43 48232 (1981) 26476 (1982) 
POS 4.06 1.22 5.77 (1990) 1.93 (1982) 
NEG 4.95 1.04 6.73 (1983) 3.63 (1986) 
SUM 9.00 0.96 10.95 (1990) 726 (1980) 
NET -0.89 2.06 1.15 (1985) -4.10 (1983) 
EXCESS 7.32 1.87 10.36 (1990) 3.87 (1982) 
EMP 720604 41636 798213 (1979) 678493 (1985) 
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 It is an indication for the dispersion of firm growth rates around the mean of net employment change. 
Sfi 
Iftl 
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The rates of job creation and job destruction, that we find are smaller than the values found by Davis 
and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992) for the U.S.. This is partly due to the fact that they included the birth 
and death of firms in their series. But that is not the whole story, since births and deaths of firms only 
account for 25% of job destruction and 20% of job creation. Other reasons may be that they used 
establishments, rather than firms and that they also included establishments with 5-10 employees. 
Those are typically the ones were lot of job creation and destruction takes place. Of course there are 
also institutional reasons, e.g. that it easier to hire and fire people in the U.S than in the Netherlands. 
We found a strong negative correlation (-0,67)IS between gross job creation and destruction rates 
over time, just as Boeri (-0.65) and Davis and Haltiwanger (-0.86). Table (A6) in the appendix, shows 
that large rates of job creation and destruction take simultaneously place in all sectors. 
Figure 3 shows clearly that POS moves pro-cyclical and NEG moves counter-cyclical. SUM moves 
less counter-cyclical than in the U.S.. In the next section we will show that SUMP (the sum of job 
creation and job destruction in persons) does move significantly counter-cyclical. 
Figure 3 Net and gross job flows (in percentage 
of total manufacturing employment) 
In addition we found that on average 56.3% of the jobs created in period t still existed in period t+1. 
with a maximum of 71,2% in 1989 and a minimum of 41.4% in 1984 . Job destruction is slightly 
more persistent. On average 59.4% of the jobs destroyed in one year, were still closed a year later. In 
1982 a maximum of 74% of the destroyed jobs one year earlier were still closed, while in 1986 only 
46.8% of the destroyed jobs were not opened again. Those values are lower than the ones found in the 
U.S.. Davis and Haltiwanger report an annual job creation persistence rate of 68% for job creation and 
1S
 t-value - 3.87 
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81% of job destruction. 
2.2.4 The cyclical behavior of job creation and job destruction 
Table (3) shows the cyclical behavior of job creation, job destruction and job reallocation. Reported 
are the coefficients of a cyclical measure, CU (capacity utilisation) and NET (net employment change) 
in an OLS regression with a constant, a deterministic time trend and if necessary, the dependent 
variable one period lagged (the latter case is indicated with a *). As we would expect, job creation is 
strongly pro-cyclical and job destruction is strongly anti-cyclical. Just as found by Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1990) and Blanchard and Diamond (1990) in the U.S., job reallocation in the Netherlands 
moves counter cyclical. In section 3 we will discuss several possible explanations. 
Table 3 The cyclical behavior of job flows 
POSP* NEGP* POS NEG SUMP* SUM 
NET(P) 
t-value 
R2 
DW 
Durbin h 
0.332 
(4,79) 
0.87 
0.277 
-0.654 
(-8.89) 
0.93 
0.332 
0.46 
(9.44) 
0.95 
2.34 
-0.54 
(-11.01) 
0.92 
2.20 
-0.296 
(-222) 
0.48 
0.778 
-0.076 
(-0.51) 
0.64 
2.24 
CU 
t-value 
R2 
DW 
Durbin h 
178414 
(2.38) 
0.71 
-0.810 
-355775 
(-3.52) 
0.70 
-1.269 
0.37 
(4.54) 
0.82 
1.94 
-0.32 
(-2.47) 
0.38 
1.74 
-2.12 
(-2.03) 
0.45 
-0.01 
0.051 
(0.55) 
0.63 
2.11 
sample period 79-91. 
Table (A6) in the appendix shows the cyclical behaviour of job reallocation per industry. It appears 
that in most sectors job reallocation is (insignificantly) countercyclical. Only in the primary metal 
sector and the electronic and other equipment sector there exists a significant anti-cyclical pattem of 
job-reallocation. 
There is a lot of variation in the persistence of job flows over the cycle. The correlation coëfficiënt of 
net employment changes (NET) with the fraction of newly created jobs that still existed a period later 
11 
is 0.86, while for the fraction of destroyed jobs that were not fïlled up a period later, the correlation 
with NET is -0.84. The persistence of job creation is thus strongly pro-cyclical, while the persistence 
of job destruction is strongly countercyclical. 
2.2.5 How important are aggregate shocks? 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) found that the time variation in job creation and job destruction in the 
U.S. was primarily driven by idiosyncratic shocks. Unfortunately our data set does not allow us to 
decompose the employment growth rates of individual firms into an idiosyncratic, a sectoral and* an 
aggregate part. However we could test whether sectoral changes in job creation and job destruction are 
primary driven by aggregate or sector specifïc shocks. 
First we will decompose the establishment growth rate per sector in a sector specifïc and an aggregate 
part: 
'S« S n S laggr 
where g,t is the sectoral growth rate g'„ is the residual component of the sectoral growth rate and g w 
is the aggregate growth rate. Now if the economy is primary driven by aggregate shocks (oilprice 
changes, growth of the world economy etc), then g'„ = g„ - g^, will be small compared to g ^ = g,, -
The sector weighted growth rates are given by: 
POS = Y, 
sc*sic 21 EMP 8* 
g« 
E ix„-*„-i l 
NEG = JJ 
sd*sic 21 
*«4 
EMP Ssdl 
where &* = 
E l* -x, .1 I tl cl-\' 
*sdi 
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x^cx is the average of total employment at shrinking (growing) establishments in sector s at time t and 
t-1, EMP is total employment, E„ is the set of firms in s at t, and xtt is firm level employment at time 
t. The SUM series can be obtained by summing up POS and NEG. 
Given the decomposition of growth rates, we use the same methodology as Davis and Haltiwanger, to 
investigate whether job creation, job destruction and job reallocation are primary driven by sectoral or 
aggregate shocks, we therefore define the adjusted sectoral job creation rate as: 
39 
POSadj = Y, 
isicll 
NEGadj and SUMadj are calculated in a similar way. 
Now consider the following identities: 
POS = POSadj + (POS - POSadj) 
NEG = NEGadj + (NEG - NEGadj) 
SUM = SUMadj + (SUM - SUMadj) 
Which imply the following variance decompositions: 
Var(POS) = Var (POSadj) + Var(POS - POS adj) + 2Cov(Posadj, (POS - POSadj)) 
Var(NEG) = Var (NEGadj) + Var(NEG - NEG adj) + 2Cov(NEGadj, (NEG - NEGadj)) 
Var(SUM) = Var (SUMadj) + Var(SUM - SUM adj) + 2Cov(SUMadj, (SUM - SUMadj)) 
The sign of die covariance term tells us something about the interaction of aggregate and sectoral 
shocks, a positive sign implies that the shocks move in the same direction. 
Table (4) shows that both job creation and job destruction are mainly determined by aggregate shocks. 
While the time variation in gross job reallocation is also for a large part driven by sectoral shocks. 
We do want to stress that including idiosyncratic effects can change the results. Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1990) find that 80% of the variation of job reallocation in continuing establishments is due to 
idiosyncratic effects. 
EMP 
39 
Ssctl = £ 
EMP \&scit ooi 
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Table 4 The relative impact of sectorai and aggregate shocks" 
Var(POSadj)/Var(POS) = 0.121 
Var(POS - POSadj)/Var(POS) = 0.902 
2Cov(POSadj,(POS-POSadj))/Var(POS) = -0.007 
Var(NEGadj)/Var(NEG) = 0.117 
Var(NEG - NEGadj)/Var(NEG) = 1.331 
2Cov(NEGadj,(NEG-NEGadj))/Var(NEG) = = -0.380 
Var(SUMadj)/Var(SUM) = 0.475 
Var(SUM - SUMadj)/Var(SUM) - 0.405 
2Cov(SUMadj,(SUM-SUMadj))/Var(SUM) = 0.107 
2.3 The relationship between job and worker flows 
If we calculate employment in and outflow (excluding job-to-job-flows) as fractions of total employ-
ment for the period 79-91 and if we use our manufacturing rates of gross job creation and destruction 
as proxy for the whole economy, we can tentatively say something about the fraction of worker flows 
that is driven by job flows. We find that the average sum of employment in and outflow is on average 
21.5% of total employment when job-to-job movements are excluded and 32.5% of total employment 
when they are included. The sum of job creation and destruction is 8.21% of employment ", which is 
25.3% of the total worker flows (including Fee) and 38.2% of employment in and outflow (excluding 
Fee). Those numbers can exceed the true values because of double-counting of the lay-offs in 
shrinking firms who directly find a job at a growing firm in the same sector. We therefore define a 
new variable, MAX,, which measures max {POS,„ NET,,}. The average value of MAX,, is 5.34% 
which is 16.5% of the total worker flows, including the job to job movements and 24.8% of the 
worker flows, excluding job to job movements. 
Hamermesh et al. (1994) used a representative sample of Dutch Arms which also gave information on 
interna! mobility at the firm level and found that job flows account for 31.81 % of the worker flows. 
This is about the same order as Anderson and Meyer (1994) find for the U.S., they report that 31% of 
16
 We have excluded SIC 28 (petroleum) and SIC38 (instruments) because of missing data. Including those sectors (period 
82-91) leads to very similar results. 
17
 This is probably a Iower bound on the true value for the whole economy, because of the way job creation and job 
destruction were calculated. 
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the worker flows in the manufacturing sector are driven by job reallocation, while for the other sectors 
this is 40%. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) estimate that between 35 and 56 % of the worker flows are 
driven by job creation and destruction. 
The empirical results can be explained with a model in which the timing of labor reallocation is 
considered to be endogenous and mainly takes place in recessions. Davis and Haltiwanger's (1990) 
model is a good starting point for analyzing this issue. In the next section we will therefore work out a 
model very similar to theirs to study the effects of demand and allocation shocks on an efficiently 
working market economy. We will also give an explanation for the fact that worker flows move in the 
same direction, while job flows move in different directions. 
3. A Model of Labor Reallocation 
Let us first summarize very shortly the most important stylized facts we have to explain. (1) Flows 
into and out of employment and unemployment are large, relative to the stocks. (2) The sum of 
employment inflow and outflow and job creation and destruction moves countercyclical. (3) A large 
fraction of worker flows is associated with job creation and job destruction. (4) Employment inflow 
and outflow move in the same direction, while job creation and job destruction move in opposite 
directions. 
We will explain those facts with a model in which reallocation takes time and resources. When a firm 
engages in reallocation some of its resources cannot be used for "normal" production, thus according to 
this view the costs of reallocation are in the form of foregone production. Since recessions are times 
when aggregate demand falls, the costs of reallocation are lowest during those periods. First we will 
look at some of the other explanations and comment on them briefly. 
3.1 Other Explanations 
In the literature there are a number of different possible explanations for the empirical results of 
section 2, which will be discussed briefly below. 
-Caballero and Hammour (1992) come up with a model in which fast job creation is costly and fast 
job destruction is not. Because of this, job destruction is concentrated in short periods, while job 
creation takes place all over the cycle. 
- Related is NickePs (1992) model that explains the anti-cyclical behavior of job reallocation (job 
creation plus job destruction) by noticing that in booms, labor markets are tighter and hiring labor is 
more expensive. This makes job creation more expensive in booms. A problem with this explanation is 
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that in recessions quit rates are much lower, which makes job destruction more expensive due to 
positive firing costs. Nickel argues that the costs of job destruction in recessions are lower than the 
costs of job creation in booms and hence job reaüocation is anti-cyclical. A better explanation that is 
also related to adjustment costs would probably be that if the costs of firing are fixed, then it would 
pay for a firm to fïre workers in large groups. 
-Lame duck effects (the least productive firms go bankrupt in a recession) could explain part of the 
story, but Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) show that the proportion of job destruction due to plant 
closings decreases slightly during recessions (the absolute rate of dying establishments does increase). 
Blanchard and Diamond (1990) believe that the fear for bankruptcy could explain the asymmetry. In 
good times, firms do not worry much about slack, while in bad times, when there is the threat of 
bankruptcy, the slack is squeezed out. 
-Explanations with a matching function, see e.g., Blanchard and Diamond (1990), Pissarides (1991) 
and for the Netherlands van Ours (1991) and Lindeboom et al. (1993). 
Frictions on the labor market, imply the existence of a matching function, often in the form 
h=m(U,V), where h is the number of hires which is increasing and concave in U and V, m is the 
number of primary workers getting a job, U is unemployment and V is the number of vacancies. It is 
assumed that the economy is subject to continual job creation and job destruction. In recession here 
interpreted as an increase in job destruction and a decrease in job creation ), the flow of workers out 
of employment increase, but because of the increase in U, the number of successful matches will also 
increase. On the other hand, the decrease of vacancies will lead to fewer successful matches18 This 
implies that worker flows can either be pro-cyclical or anti-cyclical. In Mortenson and Pissarides 
(1993), job destruction can take place instantaneously, while job creation is, through the presence of a 
matching function, a more time-consuming process. 
3.2 The assumptions of the labor reaüocation model 
Since the main goal in this section is to study the behavior of the labor reaüocation process, under 
aggregate demand and allocation shocks, we will abstract here from all kinds of possible market 
clearing disturbances. 
We will consider an economy with two production sites, high productivity sites and low productivity 
sites. At the beginning of period t, H, infinitely lived consumer-workers are matched to high-
productivity sites, each producing output YH. For simplicity, we will distnbute all the workers over the 
unit interval. In this case there are thus 1-H, workers matched with low-productivity sites, producing 
A vacancy can arisc by job creation or by a quit 
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output YL, where YL < YH. Let a, be the fraction of high-productivity sites that revert to low 
productivity sites within period t; thus a fraction (1-aJ of the high-productivity sites remains high ". 
We will assume that there are operation costs involved for a worker who moves from a low-
productivity site to a high-productivity site. Those costs are equal to one unit of time input by one 
(low-productivity) worker. Davis and Haltiwanger (1990), give three interpretations for those costs: 
(1) The worker's time cost of moving (according to this interpretation, unemployment is a direct 
consequence of employment reallocation). 
(2) An adjustment cost, in the form of foregone production caused by the opening of a new site. 
(3) An investment in human capital by the worker and site owner. The costs of this investment are 
foregone production. 
Reallocation of labor can cause unemployment not only through the time it takes for a worker to move 
from a low productivity site to a high productivity site, but also for example through matching 
problems. Aghion and Howitt (1991) argue that if reallocation is the process of "creative destruction" 
of low productivity jobs and their replacement by new high productivity jobs, the inflow rate into 
unemployment will increase after reallocation. Although this effect is not present in our model it is 
useful to recognize that reallocation may lead to higher unemployment. 
For a given a„ there has to be made a decision about the fraction of workers at low productivity sites 
who will be moved to high productivity sites, arriving at the beginning of period t+1. We will assume 
that the fraction of high productivity sites equals or exceeds the number of low productivity sites. Let 
© be the fraction of workers who move from low to high productivity sites. Then the law of motion 
for state variable Ht is given by: 
HM = (1 - a)H, * ©,[1 - H, * o/yj (1) 
The first term in this equation gives the number of high-productivity sites who remain high and the 
second term gives the fraction of [old lows + new lows] which become high productivity sites in the 
next period. 
The utility of consumption for all consumer-workers in period t is given by: A,U(CJ, where At is a 
utility shifter. A change in A, will be interpreted here as an aggregate demand shock. A, and a, are 
In multi sector economies with central wage bargaining, a rise in a is equivalent with a situation in which productivity 
in one sector rises less than the centrally bargained wage. 
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assumed to follow a fïrst order Markov process. 
At time t, a worker chooses a contingency plan that maximizes life time utility, given by 
£ JS'-'AWQ (2) 
t'i 
Where U'(Q > 0, U"(Q < 0, A lim U'(Q = ~ 
c-o 
Aggregate consumption in time t is equal to: 
C, = (1 - o)H?H + [1 - H, * nJSt](l - 9t)YL O) 
Thus all income from both high and low productivity sites is being consumed. The opportunity costs 
of reallocation are represented by the term ©,[1 - H, + CT, HJY,, which denotes foregone production. 
Before we proceed, something will be said about the interpretation of CT,. Since we assumed that the 
number of high productivity sites (operational and non-operational) always equals or exceeds the 
number of low productivity sites, we can think of CT„ not only as the rate at which high-productivity 
sites become low-productivity sites, but also as the rate at which new high-productivity sites become 
available. Hence CT, can be seen as a reallocation shock. The causes of the reallocation shocks will not 
be discussed in detail here, we can think of them as idiosyncratic productivity disturbances. In a multi 
good model taste shocks could play the same role. 
For our purposes it is not necessary to specify the whole wage process. We will assume that the wage 
formation process supports efficiënt mobility behavior. Some kind of Nash-equilibrium model, in 
which workers will get part of the extra earnings due to a successful match, will do the job. 
Finally we will assume that there are no taxes or other distortions so that the competitive equilibrium 
is equal to the solution of the social planner's problem of the model (see, e.g. Stokey and Lucas, 
1989). 
33 The Social Planner's Problem 
The social planner's problem can be formulated as a stochastic dynamic progranuning problem, with 
Bellman's functional equation given by: 
Subject to the law of motion (1). 
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( 
V(HA,o) = max [AU[a-at)H,YH * (1 - Ht + afl)0-Q)Y,} * fiEW{H,tV a„x ^4,+I)]] 4 
e-[o,y N 
Under the assumptions that A, o, © and H, can take a finite though large number of values and that 
H^, can take the same values as H,, the value function will be a finite dimensional vector. A unique 
optimal reallocation policy function ©(H,A,a) can then be found in five steps: (1) Make an initial 
guess for V on the r.h.s. of (4). (2) Solve the maximum problem in (4) for 0 , , given each H„ a„ and 
A, combination. (3) Substitute the maximized solution into the objective function of (4). (4) Solve for 
V on the l.h.s.. (5) iterate with this solution as a new guess for V on the r.h.s. 
For now, we are only interested in how the optimal policy function ©(H,A,a) reacts to innovations in 
A and er. 
Off corners and under the optimal reallocation policy function, the value function, V, is differentiable 
inH20 with: 
a F ( ? ^ ' o ) - AH - o)[YH - (i - e)rji/'(C) + /to. - a)(i - e)E 
on 
dV(H,A,a) 
dH\A,a (5) 
Where H = (1 - a)H + 6(1 - H + aff) (See equation (1)). 
overlined variables denote next perïod values. 
Because a unique value function exists and since (S) holds for the optimal value of @(H,A,a), the 
r.h.s. of (5) can be treated as a Standard maximizing problem. If we substitute eq. (3) for C and also 
substitute the law of motion (1) in (5) and then differentiate (5) with respect to © we get: 
YjAU'Kl - a)YjjH + (1 - H)YJ = fiE^ dv^'a^ |A,O 
dH 
(6) 
Equation (6) tells us that under an optimal reallocation policy, the utility costs from foregone output, 
caused by moving a worker from a low productivity site to a high productivity site is equal to the 
expected utility gains resulting from a better allocation of employment at the beginning of the next 
period. 
20
 For a proof, see Lucas and Stokey (1989), ch 9. 
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It will be interesting to see how the number of badly matched movers responds to a change in the 
number of currently employed high-productivity workers. Therefore let us define M, the number of 
workers who move, M = ©(1 - H + aH), thus: 
— = -(1 - o)9, Since — = (1 - o) - (1 - o)6, We can write: 
dH dH rjy 
= (1 - o) 
dH dH 
The first part of the r.h.s. of (7) rëpresents the consumption smoothing effect, as discussed above. The 
response to a positive wealth shock, is not to consume everything at once but to invest part in an 
improved future allocation of workers. The second term of the r.h.s. of (7), gives us the direct effect 
of H on M. For a given 0, an increase in H will reduce the necessity to open more high productivity 
sites. 
The marginal rate of transformation between future and current consumption is given by21: 
AU
'<e> - Ü B K I - O ) 
fiE(AU'(&) YU 
Equation (8) tells us that the greater the number of high productivity sites which are operational in the 
future and the higher the ratio YJ/YL, the more current consumption will be allocated to the future. 
One problem with this model is that, while it can explain unemployment fluctuations, labor supply is 
implicitly assumed to be inelastic. Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) introducé a downward sloping 
demand for leisure, to get a positive relation between aggregate demand shocks and labor supply. 
In the next paragraph, a slightly different model will be presented in which aggregate demand 
disturbances also have direct effects on labor demand, this model is very similar to Townsend's (1990) 
model. 
3.4 Firm specific demand shocks and leisure 
In the previous section we assumed that output was random across sectors, now we will extend the 
model and assume that the output of each plant within the two sectors is random. People employed in 
21
 For a derivation, see appendix Al. 
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the different sectors and people who are searching have different utility functions caused by different 
labor supply behavior, given by, AU(C, T - a^ in the high-productivity sector, AU(C, T - a j in the 
low productivity sector and AU(C,T - S) in the search status mode. Here T is common available time, 
aH is labor time in high productivity sectors, aj, is labor time in low productivity sectors and S is the 
time spent searching. Accordingly we will define the production functions ffe,) and fl^aj to be equal 
to the output of working a hours in respectively the high productivity and the low productivity sector. 
In this section we will interpret the reallocation costs as the time it takes for a worker to move from a 
low productivity site to a high productivity site. During that time he is thus unemployed. We will also 
give a different interpretation for ®„ instead of the fraction of workers being reallocated, ©t will 
represent the probability for an individual low productivity household to be moved to the high 
productivity sector. The problem now is to find a functional equation for the "representative con-
sumer," since we have explicit diversity across firms and households. We can do this by weighting the 
utility functions for consumption and leisure, over the different sectors. 
The social planner's problem is then to find: 
V(H,oj) = Max[(H - aH)AU(c,T-aH) + (1 - H + aH)[Q.-Q)AU(<:,T-al) 
+ &AU(c,T-S)] * fiEVÜa^M 
(9) 
s.t.: c = (l-a)HfiflH) + (1 - H + ofl)(l - ej/fo^) 
and the law of motion (1). 
The weights are given by: (1-<J)H (the number of workers in the high productivity sector), 
(l-H+aH)(l-©) (the number of workers in the low productivity sector) and (1-H+oH)® workers in the 
search state mode. 
The "Benveniste and Sheinkman-equation" (the equivalent of equation 5) of this problem is extremely 
messy and does not give much information. In the appendix, A2 it will be shown that the first order 
condition with respect to © implies: 
AWicT-aJ - U(c,T-S) +Xar)[(l-e)tfe(c,7VflI) + eUc(c,T-S)]] = j g £ 8 ^ ' o ) 
dH\A,a 
(10) 
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The first term of the lJh.s. of equation (10) represents the difference in utility between working \ 
units of time in the low productivity sector and being in the search status mode, this term could be 
interpreted here as the disutility of working instead of enjoying leisure. The second term represents the 
utility of consumption from working aL units of time, where the (low productivity) output is shared 
between low productivity workers and the unemployed. A different interpretation for this term is the 
foregone utility of consumption, caused by reallocation in the current period. The r.h.s. of (10) gives 
the expected utility gains resulting from an improved future allocation of labor. Thus at an interior 
solution for @, the total utility of leisure and improved future allocation is equal to the current 
consumption loss due to reallocation. 
Equation (9) has got the following implications for leisure: 
-Ua(c,T-aH) = A(\-a)Hf'{aH)Uc{c,T-aH) (11a) 
-Ua(c,T-aL) = Ail-H+omy'iaJUXcT-a,) (11 b) 
A derivation of (11 a) and (11 b) can be found in the appendix A2. 
Equations (11 a b) teil us that at an interior solution, the utility that one gets by consuming the output 
of one extra hour of work equals the disutility of working one extra hour (or the utility of one hour of 
leisure). Implicitly it is assumed that \JM and U^ are negative (or that the value of leisure is positive). 
Thus at an equal weight Pareto optimum, one is indifferent between working one hour extra (and 
getting more consumption) or enjoying one hour extra free time. 
A problem with the model above, is that one is either in one sector or in another or being reallocated, 
while it would be more realistic that labor supply decisions would vary over the three states. 
Townsend (1990) shows elegantly how one could do this while maintaining the setup of a representa-
tive consumer. For a summary of his model, see appendix A3. 
3.5 The effects of Demand and Allocation shocks on Labour Reallocation 
When there is a temporary fall in aggregate demand (a negative innovation in A), consumption will 
decrease but job reallocation, and the number of movers, M will increase. More labor is reallocated (© 
rises) because the marginal utility costs of foregone production, given by the l.h.s. of (6), are lower 
when aggregate demand, A is lower. An increase in 0, will, according to the equation above (7) lead 
to an increase in M, by (1 - H + aH) times the change in ©. 
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When we also take the effects of leisure and labor demand into account, the increase in © will even be 
bigger because the relative rewards of working as opposed to leisure will be lower when aggregate 
demand has fallen. In terms of equation 11: When A falls, the marginal value of leisure -UA, rises, 
which means that in equilibrium more leisure is consumed. In addition the demand for labor will 
decrease in response to an adverse aggregate demand shock. The same story can be told for a negative 
productivity shock. To sum up: the largest rates of job reallocation (in particular job destruction) will 
take place in sectors that face low productivity or low aggregate demand. 
Thus the observed correlation between aggregate demand and unemployment fluctuations can (at least 
partly) be explained with a model that takes the influence of aggregate demand disturbances on labor 
reallocation into account. In this simple model, the ultimate sources of temporary unemployment are 
not aggregate demand disturbances, but allocative disturbances. 
Market economies in general, but in particular economies which are in a transformation process from a 
centrally planned economy to a market economy face large allocative shocks. We will now analyze 
two different kinds of allocative shocks which lead to different outcomes. First, consider an unex-
pected increase in a, this is similar to a decrease of high productivity sites, H. One direct effect of this 
shock will be a lower demand for labor, since output per worker will feil. Another direct effect will be 
substitution from work into leisure. Job destruction will thus rise in response to a positive innovation 
in o. If the innovation in CT is considered to be persistent, the marginal rate of transformation (from 
future to current consumption) will feil (see equation (8)) this makes it less attractive to transform 
lows into highs. In addition, we can see from equation (11) that a positive innovation of a increases 
the relative utility of leisure since the rewards of work feil. This will lead to substitution from 
allocation activity into leisure. In summary, a positive innovation of a, leads to a strong increase of 
employment outflow and only to a small next-term increase of employment inflow22. 
An alternative form of an allocative disturbance, is an increase in the ratio f(aH)/f(aL). This will 
stimulate substitution out off leisure into the high productivity sector, since an increase in f(aH), makes 
working more attractive than leisure. But it will also increase the substitution from leisure into the low 
productivity sector since the marginal rate of transformation, given by (8), will rise. This causes 
substitution from leisure into reallocation activity23. So this type of allocative shock will have 
For a given 0 , an increase in er will lead to more "movere" from lows to highs 
23
 If for example fla^ increases, f (a„) will decrease in equation (11) which will lead to substitution into leisure, it will be 
assumed that this income effect is lower than the substitution effect from leisure into production. 
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substitution from leisure into reallocation activity23. So this type of allocative shock will have 
different effects on the magnitude of employment inflow compared to an innovation of a, since now 
near-term job creation will also rise. 
There are still two more important stylized facts that we have to explain. The first one is the observed 
procyclical behavior of productivity. According to the model in the previous sector, reallocating is 
going on during recessions. Bean (1990) comes with a similar kind of explanation. He argues that a 
large share of the labor force is diverted to the production of goods in times when the marginal 
revenue is high (in booms) and that in recessions a relative larger share is diverted towards in-
vestment-like activities like human capital formation, which do not count as output in the official 
statistics. So the procyclical movement of productivity may result from the static concept of produc-
tivity in the statistics. Moreover Bean finds, with a VAR model a negative long run effect of a 
demand innovation on productivity. Saint Paul (1993), who also used a VAR model, concludes that in 
most countries both the short and long run effect of a positive demand shock on productivity, are 
negative in most countries. Those results are in line with the job reallocation model. 
Another puzzle is that gross employment inflow and outflow seem to move closely together, while 
gross job creation and job destruction move in opposite directions. Burda and Wyplosz (1993) explain 
those facts with a model in which unemployment outflow and job creation are determined by a non-
increasing matching function and in which it is costly to create new jobs. Because of that, worker 
reallocation is preferable to job destruction. They also make a distinction between vacancies correspon-
ding to an existing position and vacancies for which a workplace has yet to be created. Before we 
proceed with summanzing their model, first some variables will be defined; e is the total number of 
workers being employed, j is the number of jobs and is equal to e plus the unfilled jobs, and vacancies 
(v) are unfilled jobs j-e plus planned positions v-(j+e). They argue, that if the value of a match (y) 
declines, e.g. because of a demand shock, the v,u ratio (v/u) will decrease. If the economy achieves 
this reduction by (1) laying off workers (reducing e) or (2) destroying filled jobs (reducing j and e 
simultaneously), the observed patterns of job and worker flows can be explained (discrete jumps in job 
destruction, accompanied by large worker flows). The higher unemployment level leads to more 
matches and thus inflow into employment. All of this happens independently of job creation. One 
necessary condition is that the amount of planned positions has to be smaller than the number of 
unfilled jobs (because the cheapest way to decrease vacancies is by elimination of planned positions). 
Furthermore in case one, the capital value of an open job must exceed the capital loss associated with 
a layoff and the reverse must hold in case two. 
If for example fifa,,) increases, f (%,) will decrease in equation (11) which will lead to substitution into leisure, it will be 
assumed that this income effect is lower than the substitution effect from leisure into production. 
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4 Complementaries, Complexity and Policy issues 
When the perfect competition framework is dropped, several interesting issues arise. In the previous 
section we saw that the best time to reallocate is in a recession. If firms have (partly) common 
expectations about the date and size of a recession, they might time their reallocation policies 
simultaneously in a recession, thereby making this recession a reality. This is so because reallocation 
involves both large outflów of workers and low production. According to this view, allocation and 
aggregate demand are strongly connected, in their timing as well as on their effects on unemployment 
flows. It is therefore difficult to distinguish between them empirically. 
Moreover, when there are complementaries, for example through positive demand linkages between 
firms, any (common) expectation about a recession can lead to that particular recession. In other 
words, multiple cyclical equilibria can arise,24 only because firms cannot coordinate their actions. 
Those. equilibria may well be Pareto ranked. Less efficiënt outcomes arise when firms postpone their 
reallocation activities too far away. 
Another important issue is the relation between job creation, job destruction and economie growth. 
Economie history shows us that new technologies can lead to a chain reaction of job destruction and 
job creation. This observation has led to a promising new approach that views the economy as an 
evolving complex system, see, e.g. Anderson et al. (1988). When a new innovation is implemented, for 
example the car, lots of jobs were destroyed like the pony-express, coachmen etc.. On the other hand a 
new network of jobs was being created like paved road builders, taxi drivers, mechanics etc. If we 
define, following Kaufman (1988), the complexity of a good, to be a function of its uses (e.g. for a 
car: a medium of transport) and its needs (for a car: roads, steel, traffie rules etc). Now if the average 
need is greater than one, a new innovation will lead endogenously to a higher demand and need for 
more innovations. The key issue is that the number of possible innovations goes up very rapidly as 
more technologies become available. This process will go hand in hand with job creation, job 
destruction and employment in and outflow. 
The ideas of the economy as an evolving complex system arose at the "Santa Fe" institute, in 
California, where many scientists from different disciplines (e.g. the Nobel prize winners Gell-Mann 
and Anderson (Physics) and Arrow (economics) work together. Kaufman, a biologist at the Institute 
pointed out that an economie invention often becomes a catalyst for other inventions. Kaufman himself 
had been working in die beginning of the seventies, on the question how nature could have deveioped 
24
 In a similar way as in Shleifer's (1986) model. 
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a protein molecule. If the amino-acid building blocks had to chain together randomly, the expected 
time for the building of such a molecule would be more than the history of the universe. Kaufman 
then came with the idea of autocatalytic sets. An autocatalytic set can be described as follows: When 
one starts with many random molecules, it can happen that molecule A has got a weak catalytic effect 
on B and molecule B on C and so on. Now if there would be some other molecule V that closed the 
loop and catalyzed the working of A then we would get more A around to produce B and more B to 
get C. The number of molecules in the chain will grow much faster than the molecules that are not 
part of the chain. If there are more sets around, then there will be competition for resources, which 
opens the door for natura! selection so that those sets that are more robust to environmental changes 
are more likely to survive. In other words, under the right initial conditions the system itself can create 
more complex structures. Kaufinan argued that an autocatalytic set is a web of transformations in the 
same way that an economy is a web of transformations among goods and services. If an economy gets 
beyond a certain level of complexity the economy can jump to a higher equilibrium". But when the 
economy remains below that level of complexity, growth may be low and the country must rely on 
only a few major industries. This is the case in many under developed countries. 
The new technologies will for mainly be implemented in newly created jobs26. This brings us at an 
important issue for policy makers. A policy that aims to lower job destruction may also slow down the 
development of new technologies and job creation27. 
Another (old) question is whether the govemment should (if she could) dampen the business cycle. We 
have seen from our reallocation model that when aggregate demand moves cyclically, firms get the 
opportunity to reallocate cheaply in recessions (thereby increasing productivity) and then harvest in 
booms. If this is the whole story, the best policy would be a passive one. But we have abstracted in 
our model from all kinds of market imperfections, e.g. the fact that firms are more equity constrained 
in recessions and will therefore cutback the expenditures on the most risky activities (which are often 
R&D activities), see Stiglitz (1993). We also abstracted here from loss of skill effects of unemployed 
workers, see Pissarides (1993). Those effects of recessions lead to lower long-run growth and hence 
there is a potential for govemment action. To sum up, if the govemment wants to take action to 
reduce unemployment, policies that increase job creation are preferred to policies that decrease job 
Equilibrium is a risky term here. 
26
 Baily et al.(1994) show that most of the increase in manufacturing productivity takes place in plants that have also have 
increased employment. 
27
 Other arguments can be found in Broersma (1993). 
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destruction. 
Conclusion 
Let us start with summarizing the most important empirical facts. (1) The sum of job and worker 
flows moves anti-cyclical. (2) Job creation and the persistence of the newly created jobs is strongly pro 
cyclical, while job destruction and the persistence of destroyed jobs is strongly counter cyclical. (3) 
sectoral shocks seem to play a minor role in explaining the variation of job creation and job 
destruction. (4) About one third of the worker flows are generated by job creation and job destruction. 
The rest of the worker flows represents a "musical chair" among existing jobs. 
Those facts can be explained with a model in which the timing of job reallocation is endogenous and 
mainly takes place in recessions because the opportunity costs of reallocation are lower then. 
In a decentralized market economy, where there are positive demand linkages between sectors, any 
expectation about a recession can come true if firms postpone their reallocation activities till that 
recession. 
If the economy faces unexpected shocks, the model discussed in this paper would predict that those 
shocks will have a greater impact than in traditional models of the business cycle, because of the 
reallocation timing effect. This could be one explanation for the larger than expected impact that the 
two oil crises had on the world economy, in the seventies. 
The most important lesson for policy-makers is that it is not wise to prevent or stop job destruction at 
any rate because such policies may also impede job creation. 
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Appendix 1 Tables: 
Table Al. Basic characteristics of gross annual unemployment flows (xlOOO persons) 
Variable Mean S.D. Maximum Minimum 
Unemployment Inflow 526.89 U 22 659.74 396.41 
Unemployment Outflow 50.1.75 100.68 671.74 377.41 
Unemployment Outflow Rate 1.96 1.83 8.16 0.58 
Unemployment Inflow Rate 0.12 0.012 0.14 0.098 
Inflow + Outflow 1028.65 171.32 1331.48 773.8 
Unemployment (Level) 465.86 25734 839 86 
Sample Period:(71-91) 
29 
Table A2. Basic characteristics of gross annual employment flows (xlOOO persons) 
Variable Mean S.D. Maximum Minimum 
Employment Inflow 472.65 109.94 729.03 (1988) 337.63 (1971) 
Employment Outflow 420.46 67.82 532.90 (1991) 318.63 (1971) 
Job to Job movements 495.6" 164 754.9 (1983) 235.7 (1990) 
Employment Outflow Rate2' 0.097 0.01 0.11 (1987) 0.08 (1971) 
Employment Inflow Rate30 1.76 1.152 6.89 (1971) 0.55 (1984) 
(Inflow+Outflow) 893.12 171.93 1246 (1988) 65626 (1971) 
Employment (Level) 4384.91 356.55 5170 (1991) 4023 (1975) 
Sample Period: (71-91) 
Table A3 Basic Characteristics of annual flows between employment and (ww)" unemploymcnt (xlOOO persons) 
Variable Mean SJ). Maximum Minimum 
FEU 287 32 63.81 382.70 (1987) 191.00 (1979) 
FUE 161.35 35.51 227.90 (1988) 98.6 (1975) 
FEU Rate 0.065 0.01 0.08 (1988) 0.05 (1979) 
FUE Rate 0.66 0.67 2.83 (1971) 0.17 (1985) 
Sum 448.67 90.98 609.1 (1988) 3302 (1979) 
Unemployment (Level) 446.91 266.40 839.00 (1983) 49.00 (1970) 
Sample Period: (71-91), source: Sociale Verzekeringsraad (1992) 
Table A4. Correlations between employment flows 
correlation (employment in and outflow) 0.86 (10.53)' 
correlation (employment inflow, outflow rate) -0.51 (433) 
correlation (FEU,FUE) 0.65 (5.78) 
correlation (FEU-rate,FUE-rate) -0.48 (4.08) 
correlation (unemployment in and outflow) 0.77 (7.98) 
correlation (unemployment inflow, outflow rate) -0.66 (6.07) 
't-values in brackets 
28
 The job to job movement statistics were calculated for the period (79-91).During that period, employment inflow 
averaged 533.75 and the mean of employment outflow was 457.98. 
29
 The Outflow Rate is defined as Outflow/E(-l). 
The Inflow Rate is defined as InflowAJ(-l) 
31
 See footnote 2 for a description of ww unemployment benefits 
30 
30 
Table A5 The cyclical behavior of unemployment and employraent flows 
Dependent variable cap. utilization (log) real GDP growth unemployment growth 
Employment Flows 
Inflow (log) -038 (-0.71) R2=0.84 
DW-1.72 
-0.85 (-120) RM.85 
DW=1.68 
023 (1.59) RMX84 
DW=1.73 
Outflow (log) -122 (-1.73) R^.77 
h=0.69 
(*)-0.952 (-138) R2^ 
0.86 LM(4):n*R2=.30 
0.41 (4.19) RM.87 
h=0.07 
Outflow rate (log)32 (*)-0-144 (-227) RMJ.44 
lM:n*K2=Q.12 
(*) -0.08 (-137) R2-
=0.35 LM:n*R2=0.27 
0.04(3.90) RMJ.54 
LM:n*R2=0.58 
Sum (log) -0.95 (-2.16) RM.87 
DW=1.47 
-1.19 (-1.98) RMJ.86 
DW=1.46 
0.24(2.00) R^ .85 
DW=1.72 
Unemployment Flows 
Inflow (log) (*)-l .35 (-233) RM.88 
LMm'RM.37 
(*)-1.04 (-2.10) R^.87 
UA:n*J^12S 
(*)031 (3.43) R^O.91 
LM:n*R2=0.84 
Outflow (log) 0.38 (0.71) RM.81 
h=0.67 
0.80(1.08) RM.82 
LM:n*R2=1.83 
-0.20 (-1.46) R2=0.82 
LM:n*R2=0^6 
Outflow rate (log) 3.84 (224) R^ .93 
h=-0.46 
236(135) R^.92 
h=-0.29 
-030 (-134) R2=0.92 
h=-0.44 
Sum (log) -0.41 (-0.91) RM).87 
LMm'R^.OS 
-0.27 (-0.43) R^.86 
LM:n*R2=0.61 
0.09(0.73) R^ .85 
lMm*R1=0.57 
Flows between Employment 
and Unemployment 
FEU (log) -1.90 (-2.47) RMJ.83 
h=0.60 
-1.95 (-1.88) R^.77 
LM:n*R2=2.05 
0.61 (3.91) R^ .83 
h= 1.88 
FUE (log) 1.23 (128) RMJ.42 
DW=1.83 
2.40 (1.96) RMJ.47 
DW=2.00 
-0.02 (-0.09) R2=0.40 
DW=1.77 
FUE/U(-1) logs 1.62(1.18) R^ .08 
DW=1.86 
2.45(1.98) RMU0 
DW=2.05 
-0.08 (429) R^ .02 
DW=1.79 
Sum (log) (*)-0J6 (-033) RMj.78 
LMrn'R^S.Sl 
(*y0.U (-0.13) 
R^O.75 LMm*R*-5.24 
0.44(2.92) R^ .80 
h=0.0465 
Reported are the coëfficiënt estimates of the cyclical measure (see text), the t-values are in brackets 
and finally a measure for autocorrelation is reported. This is either the DW statistic or Durbin's h, in 
the case of a regression with the dependent variable lagged or an LM test with one or two lags, in case 
the h statistics could not be calculated or when the dependent variable had to be lagged twice 
(regressions with (*)). 
The Outflow rate is defuied as the outflow/stock(-l) 
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Table A6 The cyclical behavior of job creation and job destniction by sbi (sic) code. 
SBI POSrate (1987) POS rate (mean) NEG rate (1987) NEG rate (mean) 
20 & 21 4.78 4.74 5.04 4.84 
22 3.4 3.50 6.63 6.41 
23 4.23 3.76 6.11 8.71 
24 3.31 3.46 6.43 6.33 
25 6.39 4.81 4.46 6.49 
26 4.57 3.22 136 3.67 
27 5.51 3.87 3.59 3.73 
28 0.66 1.92 3.48 338 
29&30 3.56 2.93 3.97 2.80 
31 5.18 4.76 3.63 3.90 
32 3.51 4.15 3.33 5.069 
33 1.22 1.17 2.57 2.79 
34 5.73 4.60 5.15 5.18 
35 5.77 4.54 5.33 4.76 
36 2.28 1.88 1.28 4.31 
37 6.44 3.89 7.41 5.17 
38 3.95 4.22 6.60 5.93 
39 8.17 4.45 8.19 7.58 
total 4.41 3.66 3.97 4.54 
Table A7 Cyclical behaviour of job reallocation per industry 
SBI 20 & 21 -0.066 (-0.79) SBI 31 0.012 (0.97) 
SBI 22 -0.016 (-1.63) SBI 32 -0.037 (-1.83) 
SBI 23 -0.010 (-0.78) SBI 33 -0.020 (-2.98) 
SBI 24 -0.0014 (-0.30) SBI 34 0.02 (1.53) 
SBI 25 -0.021 (-1.65) SBI 35 -0.005 (-0.17) 
SBI 26 -0.016 (-0.94) SBI 36 -0.10 (-2.16) 
SBI 27 0.009 (1.14) SBI 37 0.038 (1.04) 
SBI 28 0.002 (0.225) SBI 38 -0.01 (-1.66) 
SBI 29 & 30 0.04 (1.44) SBI 39 -0.45 (-122) 
Reported are ïHë < :oefficient estimate s of NET (emplo yment change), in a regression of: 
reallocation in SBIxx on itself lagged (if necessary), a constant, and a linear time trend. The sample 
period is 79-91. 
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Appendix 2 Entry and Exit 
Our data for openings and closures are very weak, since it is not clear whether a reported entry or 
closure really takes place or if it is caused by a change in location or legal status. Nevertheless it may 
give us some additional information. In table 12, some basic statistics of job creation and destruction 
due to entry and exits of firms are presented. In addition we calculated total job creation, job 
destruction and job reallocation. The mean value for job reallocation is about the same as Boeri (1992) 
finds for Germany. 
Table A8 Entry and Exit (79-90) 
Variable Mean S.D. Maximum Minimum 
Entries 0.039 0.010 0.058 0.024 
Exits 0.033 0.06 0.042 0.025 
POStot 0.079 0.016 0.104 0.061 
NEGtot 0.082 0.015 0.109 0.061 
SUMtot 0.161 0.020 0.190 0.123 
NETtot -0.003 0.023 0.0314 -0.041 
In table 13 we see that the entry and exit of new firms is not cyclical. The pattern of total job creation 
and destruction (including the job flows due to entry and exit) remains the same. job creation is pro-
cyclical, job destruction is anti-cyclical and job reallocation is anticyclical. 
Table A9 The Cyclical Behaviour of Job Flows 
Dependent variable NETTOT CU 
Entry -0.123 (-0.75) DW=2.04 -0.105 (-0.698) DW=1.86 
Exit -0.21 (-0.207) DW=1.88 0.021 (0226) DW=1.74 
POStot 0274 (2.032) DW=1.75 0.252 (2.04) DW=2.18 
NEGtot -0.726 (-5.40) DW=1.75 -0298 (-1.41) DW=1.68 
SUMtot -0.453 (-1.68) DW=1.75 -0.033 (-0.116) DW=1.47 
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Appendix 3 Derivations 
(Al) Derivation of the marginal rate of transformation, from equations (5) and (6). 
Dividing equation (5) by YL and substituting (6) AU'(C) = BE '[...] / YL, into this equation yields: 
U'(QA(l - o)[-£] - U'(QA(1 - o)(l - 0) + U'(QA(1 - o)(l -e) = IML 
<dv^ 
JSE dH = fiE[U'(QA(l - o) substitute (6) back into this equation gives: 
- ^ ^ - - / S K l - o ) 
JJEiAU'iQ] Yi 
(A2) Derivation of equations (10) and (11). 
Substitute the law of motion (1) and the resource constraint, 
c = (l-o)Hf(aH) + (1 - H +aH)f (aj in (9) and note that: 
— = (1 -H+oH) jo the f.o.c. for 0 is: 
30 
— = (l-H+amA[-U(c,T-aL) + U(c,T-s)] - (l-H+oHWaJKl-eW^cT-aJ + eUc(c,T-S)] 30 
>(l-H+oH)fiE^A = 0 -
[dH\ 
A[U(c,T-ai) - U(c,T-S) * fiajl(X-B)UJLc,T-aJ * eUe(c,T-S)]] =fiE^ 
aH 
BV This is eq. (10) 
(11a) and (11 b) can be found by taking the f.o.c. from (9) for aH and aL. It will be assumed here 
that A only shifts the utility of consumption. First note that: 
dU 
daH 
dV 
= (l-o)Hf(aH)Ue(c,T-aH) * UAc,T-aH) 
2L = 0-a)m\-°)HA\f'(aa)Vl * UmJ = 0 -
da 
A(l-a)Hf'(aH)Uc(c,T-aH) = -U (c,T-aH) (This is equation (11 a)) 
dU 
^- = (l-ff+ofl)[(l-ey/(az)^c(c,7'-flI) + UAcT-aJ 
da 
3V 
-f*- = Q.-H+aH)(X-SW-H+oH)0.-QW'(adUc + Ua) -
daL L 
A(l-II+aHKL-ei)f,(aJUe(c,T-aJ - -Ua(c,T-aJ (This is equation (11 b)) 
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(A3) The use of fractions in the dynamic programming problem 
Let JtH(a,q,c) denote the fraction of households in the high-productivity sector who work a hours, who 
produce output q and receive consumption c. Since we assumed output to be random, let m'(q | a) 
denote the fraction of households in the high productivity sector who produce output q by working a 
hours. Then the following equation holds: 
£ it^a,q,c) = n',fy[ I a ) £ *ifa,q>c) (i) 
e qfi 
Furthermore we will define itL(a,q,c | m=0) to be the fraction of households working a hours, 
producing output q and receiving consumption c, conditioned on not moving, m=0. 
52 i t^a^c | TB=0) = itite | a,m=0)]£ itL(a,g,c | m=0) (ii) 
c qf 
Let 7tM(c | m=l) denote the fraction of moving workers who receive consumption c and finally recall 
© to be the fraction of workers who move. From the point of an individual household, all the fractions 
are considered to be probabilities. 
With this notation, the social planner's problem is to choose values for itHt(a,q,c), itu(a,q,c) 
jrmt(c | m=l) and 0t that maximize the functional equation: 
ViH^a,) = [(Ht - ot)C£AU(c,T-a)KHt(a,q,c)] * (1 - H, - o,ff,)[tt,0n=0)5>,l/(c,r-a) 
nj,a,qtc \ m=0)+ &£A,U(c,T-S)nJc | m=l)]] + fiEVtf^, o,M, Af+1] (iii) 
c 
subject to (i) and (ii) and to the resource constraint, consumption is output. 
HO.-a)Y^a,qfi(c-q)ii^a,q,c) + (1 - H + o/ï)[n(m=0)£ (c-q)nL(a,q,c | m=0) 
*** (iv) 
+
 ®E c i t».( c i '«= 1)]= 0 
c 
Finding a solution for this program is difficult and can not be done analytically. A strategy suggested 
by Townsend (1990), is to assume again that Ht can only take a limited number of values. The 
procedure then goes as follows: (1) Take an initial guess for V on the r.h.s. of (iii). (2) Fix ©t at some 
arbitrary value. (3) Solve (iii) and (iv) as a linear programming problem. (4) Do this for all possible 
values of ©t (5) Take the best decision as the new guess for V. 
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(A4) Data Sou rees and Definitions 
Abbreviations 
CBS Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Central Bureau of Statistics) 
CPB Centraal Planbureau (Central Planning Bureau) 
OECD Organisaüon for Economie Cooperation and Development 
Definitions and Sources 
Feu: FIow out of employment into unemployment due to firing, this equals the flow of persons into unemployment insurance 
(WW). 
Source: Sociale Verzekeringsraad, Kroniek van de sociale verzekeringen, 1992 
Fed: Flow out of employment into disability, this equals the inflow of persons in disability insurance (WAO/AAW). 
Source: Sociale Verzekeringsraad, Kroniek van de sociale verzekeringen, 1992. 
Feer: Flow out of employment into retirement (VUT). 
Source: CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek. 
Fer: Flow out of employment into retirement (AOW) 
Source: CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek. 
Calculated as inflow retired persons - (AOWt - AOWt-1 + deaths65+) * the participation rare of persons 60-64 years old (the 
outflow out of AOW equals the number of deaths in the cohort 65 and older) . 
Fue: The number of persons on an unemployment benefit (WW) finding employment (xlOOO). 
Source: Sociale Verzekeringsraad, Kroniek van de sociale verzekeringen, 1992. 
Fee: This series is based on the labor mobility measure, as collected by the CBS, "arbeidskrachtentelling", for 1975, 1977, 1979, 
1981, 1983 and 1985. The intermediate values were obtained by interpolaüon. For the period after 1985, we used figures from 
the Dutch Ministry of Social Affaires and Employment,in Kwartaalbericht Arbeidsmarkt 1992 ü. 
E: Employment 
Source OECD, Labor Force Statistics. 
U: Unemployment 
The total outflow out of unemployment is calculated as: outflow = Uto - AU, where Uj. is the inflow into unemployment, which 
consists of the persons receiving unemployment insurance benefit (WW) and the inflow of persons on unemployment support 
(RWW). 
The inflow of persons receiving unemployment insurance benefit is directly observable. 
source: Sociale Verzekeringsraad, Kroniek van de sociale verzekeringen, 1992. 
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The inflow of persons into unemployment support consists of persons moving from an unemployment insurance benefit to 
unemployment support, the flow of people who leave school and enter unemployment support and the flow of persons (re)-
entering the labor force via unemployment support. We approximate the latter two flows by the total flow of school-leavers. 
source: CBS, Het onderwijs vanaf 1950 
CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek 1992, 1993. 
Ministry of Social Affairs, Rapportage Arbeidsmarkt, 1988 
Tabel AIO: Sic Codes 
SIC 
code 
Industry 
20,21 Food, Kindred and Tobacco Products 
22 Textile MUI Products 
23 Clothing Products 
24 Leather and Leather Products 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 
26 Paper and Allied Products 
27 Printing and Publishing 
28 Petroleum and Coal Products 
29 & 
30 
Chemicals and Allied Products 
SIC 
code 
Industry 
31 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Pro-
ducts 
32 Stone, Clay and Glass Products 
33 Primary Metal Industries 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 
35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 
36 Electronic and other Electric Equipment 
37 Transportation Equipment 
38 Instruments and Related 
Products 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 
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